The Changing Face of the MSDF

Japan’s Self-Defence Forces have undergone a significant change in direction in past 20 years as the country has grappled with the US-unipolar system, most notably in coming to terms with the humiliation of its ‘checkbook diplomacy’ in the Gulf War, the adoption of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), and the threat environment of the War on Terror. The future is still largely uncertain while constitutional revision remains largely undesired expecting the vocal minorities. Each of the services has attempted to adapt to the modern challenges of the SDF’s role in their own ways, but like most nations, its procurement flexibility is hobbled by big war (in this case, war of defence)  mentality inherited from the Cold War – see, for instance, my previous posts on the ASDF’s prospective future fighter, the ATD-X, and the GSDF’s prospective MBT, the TK-X. In this post I will examine the Maritime Self-Defence Force’s changed role and procurement in light of its current and future use.

The MSDF has taken the brunt of Japan’s contribution to post-Cold War military operations. With its roots in the surveillance of Japanese waters for Soviet submarine incursions, it entered the post-Cold War period with a sizable diesel submarine force (Japan’s ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ could be read to rule out nuclear submarines). With the end of the Cold War came a gradual, yet significant change to the character of its operations. Just as NATO began to explore Out-of-Area Operations in the face of US grumblings of freeloading, so too did the MSDF have to look outside its borders as the US became interested in more than just its former Socialist foe. The watershed was the 1991 Gulf War, in the aftermath of which an MSDF mine-sweeping unit provided force protection and clean-up assistance to coalition forces. From that point on, the MSDF has provided logistical support for UN PKO (e.g. Cambodia – 1992), international independent disaster relief (Indonesia – 2004), and most notably logistical support and interdiction roles for US-led multilateral operations in the Indian Ocean (2003-present). Currently it is engaged in multinational anti-piracy efforts in Somalia, although its role is strictly in support of Japanese vessels. While the MSDF’s international role grows, its defence of Japan role is undiminished.

The threat from Russia has largely been replaced by the threats posed by increasingly weighty China, and sabre-rattling North Korea. The post-Cold War period has seen a number of interdictions against incursions by unknown vessels into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In a role shared with the Coast Guard (JCG) – where the JCG is unable to continue, the MSDF is to step in – these vessels were chased down – most escaped. One particular incident in March 1999 saw the JDS Destroyer Myoko and a JCG patrol ship in pursuit of two vessels detected off the Noto Peninsula. After a 20-hour chase in which only warning shots were fired, the boats escaped and were later detected entering a port on North Korea’s east coast. This was a first for both the MSDF (their first maritime police action) and the JCG (their first shots fired). The incident highlighted the problem of incursions from Japan’s neighbours and gave impetus for the Maritime Safety Law that gave the JCG the teeth they bared in December 2001 in the East China Sea in which a North Korean spy ship was scuttled by its crew following a firefight with four JCG vessels. China, too, played its part most notably in November 2004 when it is believed a Chinese Han-class nuclear attack submarine entered Japanese waters off Okinawa for two hours leading to the deployment of MSDF vessels.

The Japanese government and its services proved capable of adapting to these intrusions. While the government implemented the Maritime Safety Law, the MSDF looked into creating a special forces unit: the Special Boarding Unit. The crew of the JDS Myoko were very apprehensive about the possibility of having to board the suspicious vessel in 1999, and  with British help, the Special Boat Service, I imagine, the MSDF created the Special Boarding Unit (which is most famous for the bullying to death of a trainee in 2008). Other threats have equally been met with adaptation: for instance, Japan is a nation surrounded by nuclear powers, as the nuclear ambitions of North Korea have developed over the years, the Japanese have pursued a deterrent in the form of their Kongo and Atago-class AEGIS-equipped Guided Missile Destroyers. In 2005, after a decade of North Korean ballistic missile testing, Lockheed Martin were contracted to upgrade its Kongo-class destroyers with anti-ballistic missile capabilities. Some 20-years on from the end of the Cold War, the MSDF has carved out a out-of-area niche for itself that is likely to stick, but with military procurements worldwide traditionally lagging a good 20-years behind current planning  (e.g. Britain’s Typhoon), how is its future shaping up?

In March 2009, the MSDF commissioned  the first Hyuga-class Destroyer (official designation)/Helicopter Carrier (most practical designation), originally planned amidst some controversy. This flat-top vessel, typically carrying 4 helicopters, could, with some modifications, be used as a Short Vertical Take-Off/Landing (SVTOL) carrier. Indeed, some are even concerned/hint at a revival of Japanese carrier-borne aviation. Its primary role is anti-submarine warfare (ASW), however, its design inevitably hints at the possibility of helicopter-borne force projection and rapid reaction missions, but for now it should be considered as a ASW Destroyer with the potential for much more.

The ASW role, vital to the defence of Japan, is clearly still the core of the MSDF vision, and the real-time electronic intelligence capability required for that role is easily adapted and conducive to anti-incursion missions and a wider ABM network. Other than static sensors, maritime patrol aircraft are very important to ASW, and Japan is looking to replace its long-serving P-3C platform with the Kawasaki P-1, based on a cargo transport under development allowing for a shared cost. It will have an array of sensor packages, as well as a computer-aided anti-submarine munitions delivery package. In order to decrease sensor interference, Kawasaki are ditching fly-by-wire in favour of fly-by-light, which has yet to be deployed in a production aircraft. It is expected to enter service in 2010.

(Click for a larger image)

Finally, the last major procurement on the books is the 19DD, a 4500-tonnes (UK tonnes) destroyer to guard the prized AEGIS Guided Missile Destroyers which have become capital ships for the MSDF. It, like the Hyuga-class Destroyers, will be fitted with a small FSC-3 AEGIS phased array radar for fire-control.With a maximum speed exceeding 30 knots, a low radar cross-section mast, and a hull packed with surface-to-surface missiles, torpedoes and a 127mm cannon, it will provide the ground cover lacking in the Atago and Kongo-class vessels. The first two of four planned vessels are scheduled to be commissioned in 2012, although with the economic crisis, some slippage can be expected.

The 19DD is a key part of the MSDF’s reorganisation into a more flexible and faster reacting order of battle. Under the 2004 Mid-Term Defence Programme, the MSDF reorganised in FY2007  into a more streamlined force (see diagram, right). There are now fewer Escort Divisions with more ships, with a pair of Escort Divisions making up 4 flotillas: each pair will eventually consist of either one Hyuga-class helicopter carrier destroyer, one Kongo-class destroyer and two other destroyers (DDH-type division) or one Kongo and three other destroyers (DDG-type division). The 19DD will be included in each division to take the heat off the Kongos, freeing them up for ABM. Each of these Escort Divisions is considered a Mobile Operations Unit available for rapid-response operations.  Furthermore, the number of district fleet divisions (located within a defined area for Japan’s defence) was reduced from six to five each consisting of a slightly larger district escort division.

The streamlining is clearly about making ships available for deployment at a short term notice and it reflects the hope that some of us have for a broader MSDF role in international security operations. The Japanese government has proved itself willing to send troops at short notice to engage in the anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, which was the purpose of the reorganisation. It is a measured response that doesn’t stretch either its constitutional bounds or its primary defensive mission. In all, it is a step in the direction of becoming a more useful and internationally-interoperable modern force , something that will undoubtedly be strengthened as the new procurements roll out. The question remains: can Japan live up to the roles suggested by its growing capabilities? Time will tell.

Historical Revisionism and Mainstream Japan

Japan has recently been stirred by the sacking of Air Self-Defence Force Chief of Staff General Toshio Tamogami for authoring an essay that asks: “Was Japan an Aggressor Nation?” [in the Pacific War]. As the old newspaper trick goes, Tamogami concluded ‘no’ and has been censored for standing by that believe. Roy Berman [at Mutantfrog Travelogue] has already covered the peculiarities of the issue extensively; see ‘Gen. Tamogami Toshio, Motoya Toshio, and Abe Shinzo,’ ‘Tamogami Update,’ and ‘Still more on Tamogami‘.

Toshio Tamogami

However, you needn’t worry about Japanese ‘militarism’ because Tamogami says “his justification of Japan’s wartime acts is shared by many lawmakers and Self-Defense Forces personnel.” [The Japan Times, 2008/12/02] “I don’t think my opinions are particularly militaristic or of a rightwing nature,” he told the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, as reported in the Japan Times, “adding [that] many of his supporters are merely keeping their views to themselves.”

The whole problem with Tamogami is that he fails to see that he has done anything wrong. As a leading figure in the Self-Defence Forces, he wrote an essay that essentially absolves the Japanese guilt for its imperialism and subsequent expansion. He has been politicising the SDF, encouraging other officers to write such poorly sourced drivel, as seen in the kinds of officers that followed his example (see ‘Tamogami Update‘).

His words were in direct contravention of the Murayama Statement, thus whether he meant to submit the essay as a private citizen or not, he showed Japan’s neighbours that some high-ranking segments of Japan could still legitimately question the issue of Japan’s role in instigating the Pacific War.

Tamogami likely got the top position by pulling on the strings of his jin-myaku, the networking between people that keeps Japan running (as argued by Van Wolferen in The Enigma of Japanese Power). His fall from grace and the subsequent tumbling of skeletons out of his cupboard has shown that he has long kept his beliefs public and that he has many friends in high places, seemingly former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was one of them. Of course his opinions are shared in government and bureaucracy, and of course these figures (largely) keep them private… that is because they are not entirely foolish, which is more than I can say for Tamogami.

Japan’s Future Armour

Following the phenomenal success of my piece on Japan’s Future Fighters, I have decided to look at another element of Japan’s forces: the Main Battle Tank (MBT). Japan’s military forces (or if we don’t want to get caught up in semantic arguments: defence forces) are undergoing a change in posture reflecting the increased weakening of Article 9 of the Japanese Post-War Constitution. Japan’s current MBT is the Type-90 (T-90).

The T-90 was built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which produces among other things licensed defence products such as the PATRIOT anti-ballistic missile platform, the F-15J, and the F-2. It entered service in 1990 (hence the moniker). It is relatively lightweight at 50.2 tonnes when compared to the superlative M1 Abrams (61.4 tonnes), Challenger 2 (62.5 tonnes), or Merkava (65 tonnes), as well as having a smaller profile. The introduction of an ammunition auto-loader eliminated the need for a fourth crewman, one of the first tanks to do so. Its 120mm smoothbore cannon design is produced under license from the German company Rheinmetall, which is also found in both the Merkava and Abrams, but the rest of the design and production is wholly homegrown. It uses multi-layered armour, combined with modular ceramic composite armour, particularly on the frontal areas. In addition, the system has benefited from laser and thermal-guided gun and turret controls, supposedly one of the best fire control systems in the world.

The T-90 reflects Japan’s role in the Cold War and its own image of its post-Cold War role, essentially the defence of the Japanese islands against a conventional armed attack. It was designed and built to operate across the range of environments in Japan as an anti-tank weapon. However, with its design over 20 years old, and the concept nearly 30, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has picked up the TK-X or Type-10 (T-10).

The T-10 addresses some of the flaws of the T-90. The weight of the T-90 restricted its operations to Hokkaido as Japanese road laws forbade the use of the heavy transporter trailers needed to cart the tank around the country. The TK-X fundamentally weighs 40 tonnes and can be carried on standard commercial trailers. Furthermore, the T-90 had vertical turret boards that were likely to absorb the brunt of an anti-tank weapon whereas the T-10 has been designed with sloped turret boards to deflect some of the impact. Furthermore, the T-10 allows for more significant side armour by way of modular components.

What the T-90 did well, in many cases the T-10 is designed to do those things just a little bit better. It is a mid-generation (’3.5 generation’) tank continuing the trend towards armour vs. armour conceptions of defence despite the possibility of a wider role for the GSDF in coming years. This particular future MBT may thus, in some ways, be outdated by the time it enters service (if trends continue).

To be fair, however, Japan’s current peacekeeping role better suits medium- or light-armoured vehicles. It is in the future procurement of these systems that we will see how well the SDF has taken onboard expectations of Japanese capabilities in peacekeeping operations. Until that time, we can assume that it is business as usual at the GSDF.

Fukuda Rising

The race is now on, and it is between Fukuda and Aso, with Fukuda ahead. Both candidates put forward their views on Japanese international relations, and it is worth a read:

Aso, Fukuda agree on refueling mission, but differ on N Korea, Yasukuni
Saturday, September 15, 2007 at 17:25 EDT
Kyodo News

TOKYO – Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda and Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General Taro Aso clashed over issues surrounding North Korea and Tokyo’s war-related Yasukuni Shrine as they kicked off a dove-versus-hawk duel Saturday for the Sept 23 party presidency election to succeed Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

But Fukuda and Aso offered little differences in their policy platforms over other issues in a joint news conference, with both agreeing on the need to extend an antiterrorism refueling mission in the Indian Ocean and vowing to continue the course of structural reforms albeit with policy adjustments where necessary to revive local economies.

The ruling LDP’s election appears to be a done deal with Fukuda as the winner having already garnered widespread factional support to succeed Abe, 52, who on Wednesday abruptly announced his intention to step down and was subsequently hospitalized.

On Japan’s position on North Korea, especially in dealing with the unresolved abductions of Japanese nationals, Fukuda called for a flexible stance while maintaining the “dialogue and pressure” approach to resolve the issue.

“We must devise some means to convey to the other side our desire and readiness to conduct negotiations,” Fukuda, 71, said at the joint press conference held after the two officially filed candidacies at the LDP headquarters in Tokyo.

But Aso, who was foreign minister under both administrations of Abe and his predecessor Junichiro Koizumi, defended the pressure-oriented approach as the correct way and that it has achieved results.

“The abductions were the extreme of inhumanity,” said Aso, who shares many of Abe’s hawkish and conservative views. “We have learnt from experience that we won’t get to negotiations without pressure.”

On Yasukuni, which enshrines 14 Class-A war criminals along with the war dead, Fukuda said he wants to realize the plan to build a secular national memorial facility to commemorate the war dead.

Fukuda, who has been pursuing the plan since 2002 when he was chief Cabinet secretary, said earlier on Saturday when announcing his candidacy that he will not go to the controversial Shinto shrine to avoid upsetting Asian neighbors that suffered from Japanese wartime aggressions.

Meanwhile, Aso stressed that even if a new memorial facility is built, it would not be a replacement for Yasukuni. But he did not make clear whether he will visit the shrine.

On other issues, however, the two shared similar views. Both vowed to rebuild public trust in the party and to create a society where Japan’s graying population can live at ease, in an apparent reference to growing concerns over the sustainability of the public pension system and the possibility of a consumption tax hike.

Both candidates said they will seek to extend the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s refueling mission to support U.S.-led antiterrorism operations in and around Afghanistan.

Fukuda said he intends to consult closely with the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan and others to convince them to agree to the extension.

Aso said he will pursue a new law or other options to continue the mission beyond the Nov 1 legal deadline, noting that simply seeking an extension of the current special antiterrorism law is “quite” difficult due to strong rejection by the opposition side.

The refusal by the DPJ, which overtook the LDP as the largest party in the House of Councillors in the July 29 election, to agree to the extension was one of main reasons cited by Abe in his sudden resignation announcement. The opposition camp can delay the passage of legislation with its DPJ-led majority in the upper house.

Whoever wins will face the daunting task of steering the party through the current political deadlock with the DPJ-led opposition camp, including the imminent showdown in parliament over legislation to extend the refueling mission.

Fukuda has gained support by many LDP members in all nine factions except a small one led by Aso, 66. Public opinion in a recent Kyodo News poll also favored Fukuda 28.1% to 18.7% for Aso.

Another key issue in the LDP election will be how to shore up the party base after the devastating setback in the July election where the ruling coalition of the LDP and New Komeito party lost its upper house majority.

Earlier in the morning, Fukuda said in officially announcing his candidacy, “The current circumstances were certainly unexpected…After listening to the recommendations by many who supported my running in the race and the ensuing encouragement, I felt strongly that I must shoulder the responsibility to face this difficult situation.”

Fukuda repeatedly said he plans to seek talks with the DPJ, including its leader Ichiro Ozawa, to gain cooperation in parliamentary affairs. He was most notably referring to the refueling mission’s extension and the opposition’s demand for a snap election in the lower house.

Aso announced his candidacy Friday, criticizing the overwhelming factional support for Fukuda as backroom dealing by the other faction leaders and a “regression to old LDP politics, but vowing to “fight fairly and squarely till the end” despite being in a disadvantaged position.

Aso indicated he aims to campaign for the support of those unaffiliated with any factions, as well as the party rank and file.

The winner is assured of Japan’s premiership as the LDP controls the country’s lower house, which has final say in appointing the prime minister. The new party leader’s term will last until September 2009.

Both Fukuda and Aso come from famous political families – the former a son of former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda and the latter a grandson of former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida.

Both held key posts under Abe’s predecessor Koizumi, with Fukuda as chief Cabinet secretary and Aso as foreign minister. But their political ideologies differ in some fields.

The dovish Fukuda favors promoting amicable relations with neighboring countries, while the hawkish Aso is known for his conservative views and controversial remarks that have angered China.

Fukuda and Aso are scheduled to hold a policy debate at LDP headquarters and street campaigns in Tokyo on Sunday. They will campaign in Osaka and Takamatsu in western Japan on Monday, a national holiday, and in the northeastern city of Sendai next Saturday.

Voting will begin at 2 p.m. Sept 23, with the 387 eligible LDP lawmakers each given one ballot and the 47 prefectural chapters given three each to reflect the choices of rank-and-file members.

Fukuda is one of the LDP’s old guard. He was Chief Cabinet Secretary to Koizumi and is in large part responsible for the diplomacy that led to the Pyongyang Summit in 2002. With North Korea, he favours the ‘pressure and dialogue’ track which can be attributed to Keizo Obuchi in 1998. This places him resolutely outside the nationalist conservative camp, aligning him closer to Koizumi (who effectively used both aspects of diplomacy while in office). Fukuda has the statesmanship that Abe lacked, a Woodrow Wilson to Abe’s George W. Bush. If Fukuda can take office, then the LDP has rejected the Abe’s Young Turks.

Abe appears to have been a necessary evil, however. He pushed through the normalisation of the Defence Agency to a ministry, and tipped the balance on North Korea so that they will be grateful to see a new face in office. It has often been said that Abe was Koizumi’s ‘bad cop’ at the Pyongyang Summit. I would take this further and suggest that he was the ‘bad cop-PM’ to whatever more moderate leader follows.

I recall the NBR Japan Forum debating this very issue (although with relation to taxes) as the reason that Fukuda withdrew his candidacy last year. Abe was to be a temporary hard-liner who would get the dirty jobs of reassembling the LDP and implements tough policies so that the air would be cleared for a longer-term minister. Perhaps then, we should not underestimate the back-room management of the LDP. If such machinations are at work, then it only goes to show one thing: Japan is going through some interesting times.

Japan’s Future Fighters

From The Japan Times:

’08 defense budget boost eyed for new jets, PAC-3s
Kyodo News
Thursday, Aug. 30, 2007

The Defense Ministry plans to seek ¥4.82 trillion in budgetary appropriations for fiscal 2008, an increase of 0.7 percent from the initial budget for the current fiscal year that began April 1.

The budgetary request, reported Wednesday morning at a joint meeting of defense-related committees of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, includes ¥112.3 billion for upgrading the Air Self-Defense Force’s fleet of fighter jets.

Originally planned for next spring, the selection of next-generation fighters has been delayed because of stalled negotiations with the United States over sales to Japan of the state-of-the-art F-22A Raptor stealth fighter.

The U.S. House Appropriations Committee approved in late July a draft defense budget for fiscal 2008 that maintains a clause to ban the export of the Raptor.

The move is believed to reflect U.S. concerns about the possible leak of sensitive U.S. technology if the advanced stealth fighter is sold to Japan.

In anticipation of the bid of the next-generation fighter, Japan has its own indigenous project underway: ‘Shinshin’. It has been under development as ATDX at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, responsible for the infamous Zero, and licensee of many of the ASDF’s fighters: F15J, F2, F1 and F4EJ.